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Dynamics in European Political Identity 
ANGELIKA SCHEUER* & HERMANN SCHMITT**  
*GESIS — Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Mannheim, Germany; **MZES, 
University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany 
ABSTRACT   The creation of a political community is a difficult yet vital task for the 
European Union. Using Eurobarometer time series of 25 years and the European Election 
Study of 2004, this article reviews the state of the development of a ‘sense of community’ 
with regard to two concepts: Identity is measured in terms of perceived citizenship and pride 
to be a European citizen; we-feeling is captured by assessing trust in European people and 
acceptance of new member countries. A collective identity is growing slowly among the 
European citizens, but the data suggest a center–periphery distinction between the core 
members and the joiners of the different enlargement waves. EU citizens trust each other, but 
the East–West continental divide still remains detectable. 
KEY WORDS: European Union, political community, sense of community, identity, we-
feeling, enlargement 
Introduction 
The existence of a collective identity is generally seen as one of the central preconditions for 
EU democracy (e.g. Scharpf 1999). A collective political identity constitutes a political 
community. The idea of a political community, in turn, is intimately linked with the concept 
of citizenship. The creation of a citizenry, i.e. the codification of the rights and duties of 
individual citizens, was a core element of the process of nation-building (Kuhnle 1993). This 
citizenry, at the same time, is the source of authority of any democratic government: the 
principle of democracy requires that powers and executive competencies must originate in 
and be justified by the citizens subjected to them. The aim of our enquiries is, therefore, to 
ascertain if the citizens of the 
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European Union share a common political identity and, if they do, what have the recent waves 
of enlargement of the EU done to it?1 
European integration started out as an alliance of nation-states. It concerned first and 
foremost economic issues. Economic integration reached a peak with the realization of the 
Single European Market when member states transferred important policy-making 
competencies to the European Community. The Maastricht Treaty, which codifies this 
transfer of competencies, is actually said to have shifted the balance of EU government from a 
formerly predominantly intergovernmental to a now mainly supranational mode. In policy 
areas where intergovernmental decision making was replaced by supranational decision 
making, the position of the European Parliament as the representative body of EU citizens has 
been strengthened. 
The increasing role of supranational, as opposed to intergovernmental, decision making and 
the establishment of a European citizenship might have promoted the development of a 
political community of the EU. But the growing-together of a political community depends at 
least as much on people’s self-perceptions and identifications as on the provision of rights of 
citizenship or on predominant modes of government. Therefore, our central question can be 
reformulated as follows: do EU citizens identify themselves as such? Do they perceive their 
fellow EU citizens to be alike? Have European citizens developed a ‘sense of community’ 
that unites old and new members? 
Historical Sources of Unity and Diversity 
History has shown that the emergence of a sense of belonging and community and related 
attitudes, such as perceptions of identity and solidarity, takes a long time. Compared to the 
time that nation-states took to consolidate, the history of European integration is still rather 
short. Feelings of identity and solidarity can hardly have fully developed during these brief 
periods of history. But, of course, centuries of common European history elapsed before 
European integration began. The discourse dedicated to construct a European unity and 
identity makes reference to common roots in history, religion, science and culture in order to 
emphasize Europe as a distinctive cultural entity. ‘Graeco-Roman civilization, Christianity, 
and the ideas of Enlightenment, Science, Reason, Progress and Democracy are declared the 
core elements of this European legacy’ (Stråth 2002, 388). 
The tradition of the Greek polis and the Roman Empire influenced in similar ways the 
development of institutions in the legal system, the armed forces and the administration of 
European nation-states. All over Europe, the same sequence of reference cultures came into 
force: first Greek and Roman, then (during the Renaissance) Italian, and German and Austrian 
during the Enlightenment and Romanticism. Likewise, Europeans used to refer to common 
cultural achievements (literature, music, architecture) and to common European symbols: 
Roman monuments, the victory over Islam, the Crusades, the French Revolution (Pfetsch 
1997, 104–5). Last, but not least, Europeans consider themselves to be a community of values 
and ideas. The idea of liberty, of democracy, of the modern nation-state, individualism, 
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human rights, freedom of speech, rationality, the political republic, and the separation of 
Church and State — all this is considered to be genuinely ‘European’ (Mintzel 1997, 325–6). 
Europe is characterized not only by its common heritage. There is as much diversity and 
conflict as there are common roots. Religious and linguistic differences essentially underlie 
the major ethnic cleavages that have regularly been the reason for confrontation and war. 
Three religious cleavages are at the basis of distinct socio-cultural areas on the European 
continent: the division between Latin and Orthodox Christianity, that between the Christian 
and the Islamic world and, finally, the division between Catholics and Protestants. In addition, 
Europe exhibits a great variety of languages, which has become even more distinctive with 
the development of the nation-states in the nineteenth century. It is against this background 
that some think of Europe as a huge ‘multicultural society’ composed of a variety of religious, 
national and regional cultures (Mintzel 1997, 332–6). 
A European Political Community? 
The history of Europe suggests that the traditions of diversity, division and conflict are at least 
as strong as the common cultural heritage. This history of diversity does not necessarily 
prevent the evolution of a European political community. However, the sheer existence of 
nation-states based on a century of cultural and political autonomy constitutes an obvious 
obstacle. First, these nation-states are linguistic communities that guarantee the 
communicative competence of every citizen.2 EU citizens, by contrast, are confronted with an 
immense linguistic variety. This apparent Babel make the development of a Europe-wide 
public more difficult, but not impossible — as we can see from the fact that European 
political communication is already taking place (i.e. de Vreese 2003; Koopmans and Erbe 
2004). However, given the complex institutional structure of the EU, no effective system of 
opinion formation and interest intermediation has fully developed yet (e.g. Schmitt 2005). As 
a result, processes of legitimizing EU government still depend on the effectiveness of the 
respective national (sub-)systems. This might suggest that objective conditions for the genesis 
of a European political community are not very favourable, but such a development is not 
impossible on principle. 
Other factors might have promoted the development of a European political community. 
Not least among them is the obvious economic success of the process of European integration 
(Dalton and Eichenberg 1992; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). Also, the greater permeability of 
national borders after the agreement of Schengen, as well as the ever-increasing contact 
frequency of European citizens as a result of progressing economic integration, might have 
promoted perceptions of community and mutual solidarity among EU citizens (Schmitt and 
Treiber-Reif 1990; Bosch and Newton 1995). The political concept of a European identity 
was designed by the Copenhagen summit in December 1973 and followed by the 
establishment of symbols like the flag and the anthem in the beginning of the 1980s. The 
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common currency is the strongest symbol of European unity because it comes closest to 
citizens’ everyday life (Risse 2003). In the same way, the introduction of European 
citizenship is a symbol that imitates the nation-state in order to stimulate a European political 
community. 
Our prime purpose is to determine the degree to which the EU has developed into a 
political community. After this brief review of objective conditions, we will now turn to both 
a more subjective and empirical view. According to Easton (1965, 177), a political 
community exists when members show some readiness or ability to work together to resolve 
their political problems. That a European political community in such terms exists is 
unquestioned, but we are interested in knowing whether European citizens, during almost half 
a century of European integration, have developed a European ‘sense of community’. The 
existence of a political community does not necessarily require that its members are aware of 
it — i.e. the prior existence of a sense of community. However, the stronger such a sense of 
community is developed, the greater are the system’s stress-reducing capabilities (Lindberg 
and Scheingold 1970). 
This concept sense of community was first introduced by Karl Deutsch. He defines it as ‘a 
matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of “we-feeling”, trust and mutual consideration; of 
partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions 
of behaviour, and of co-operative action in accordance with it’ (Deutsch et al. 1957, 36). 
Easton (1975) follows Deutsch in his conceptualization of the ‘sense of social community’; in 
his view, cohesion emerges between people regardless of the type of political regime in which 
they live. He, therefore, distinguishes this ‘sense of social community’ from a more specific 
‘sense of political community’. In his typology of political support, the latter represents the 
highest (i.e. the most basic and enduring) category of diffuse support for the political system. 
Our empirical investigation of the sense of a European community distinguishes two basic 
dimensions. Identification refers to the citizens themselves: do they consider themselves as 
European citizens and are they proud to be European? We-feeling refers to fellow citizens: do 
European citizens consider their fellow Europeans to be as trustworthy as their countrymen? 
Which new members, if any, are they ready to accept into ‘their’ Union? Figure 1 illustrates 
this conceptualization and specifies the operationalization strategy pursued in the following. 
These notions of identification and we-feeling are compatible with modern theories of 
intergroup relations. Their starting point is the distinction between ingroups and outgroups 
(Tajfel and Turner 1986). Minimal differentiation is sufficient to give rise to an ingroup-
outgroup distinction. This is reinforced by overstating similarity within the group and 
differences to other groups. Ingroup membership is an important factor in the formation of 
personal identity. Ingroup–outgroup relations are driven by social processes of categorization, 
comparison, competition and conflict. As a result of these dynamics, perceptions of ingroups 
are biased toward homogeneity, and the attitudes towards outgroups and their members are 
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Figure 1. Concepts, indicators and data sources. EES, European Election Study 2004; EB, 
Eurobarometer. 
characterized by stereotyping and hostility. In this view, the evolution of a sense of 
community among EU citizens is the result of ingroup formation. Shortly after World War II, 
intergroup conflict between European societies was still extremely high. One of the central 
aims of the founding fathers of the European Union was to reduce conflict and overcome 
hostility between European societies by creating a new, superior ingroup which eventually 
would lead to the development of European identifications and we-feelings. We aim at 
measuring the success of European ingroup formation after half a century of economic and 
political integration, and after five successive waves of enlargement. The data that are used 
for this purpose are from the European Election Study 2004 (EES) plus selected 
Eurobarometer trends (EB). The indicators are discussed one by one, in the sequence 
suggested by the analytical scheme above. 
Identifications 
This section is dedicated to monitoring the evolution of European identifications. First, mass 
perceptions of European citizenship are tracked over a period of twenty-five years (1982 to 
2007). Secondly, the development of pride in being European is compared across countries. 
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Perceived citizenship 
Eurobarometer have used two different instruments for the analysis of European 
identification. The first was fielded eleven times between 1982 and 1992, and now repeated in 
the European Election Study 2004. This question asks whether people, in addition to their 
national citizenship, also consider themselves as European citizens.3 The second instrument 
started a new Eurobarometer time series in 1992 when the first trend was discontinued. In 
twenty surveys between 1992 and 2007, people were asked to think about their future political 
identification.4 Although the two measures are not strictly comparable, they still offer an 
impression of the direction of trends over the whole period. Detailed results for the more 
recent trend are documented in Table A1; these figures report, country by country, 
proportions of respondents who think of themselves as European citizens. 
Here, we concentrate on describing the overall trends using both indicators (Figure 2). The 
lines report proportions of respondents who ‘never’ think of themselves as European citizens 
(according to the first indicator), and who see themselves in the near future as ‘only national’ 
(according to the second). Choosing these negative poles seems to be the best way to make 
the two trends comparable. Average proportions are displayed for six country groups: the 
original six plus the countries of the five successive expansions. This presentation of the data 
follows the expectation that duration of membership has a positive impact on identification 
levels: the longer the country is a member of the EU, the stronger should be European 
identification and the weaker national-only identification. We thus expect to find a pattern 
similar to the one identified for the development of general EU support (see, e.g., Schmitt and 
Treiber-Reif 1990; Dalton and Eichenberg 1992; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Bosch and 
Newton 1995). This expectation, however, is not fully borne out by the data. Rather, country 
group characteristics come to the fore. While citizens in the original six member countries are 
still the most ‘European’ (i.e. the less exclusively national), the first and oldest expansion 
(adding the UK, Ireland and Denmark to the Community) brought in more Euro-distant 
publics. Contrary to this, the second expansion (adding Spain, Portugal and Greece) integrated 
distinctly pro-European publics; these citizens consider themselves as ‘European’ as those in 
the founding member countries. The third expansion of the Union (adding Austria, Sweden 
and Finland) is somewhere in between: fewer ‘European self-perceptions’ than in southern 
Europe, but more than in Britain, Ireland and Denmark, and the trend displays an increasing 
degree of European identification. The latest and largest expansions of the Union — adding 
eight post-communist countries of central and eastern Europe plus Cyprus and Malta in 2004 
as well as Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 — brought in surprisingly European-minded 
citizens: One in two citizens of the youngest member countries thinks of herself as a European 
citizen. However, only the longer trends will show how identification is developing in these 
new member countries. 
The duration argument also implies that European identifications should grow more or less 
steadily over time, while national-only identifications 
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Figure 2. Feeling like a European citizen, 1982–1992 (percentage ‘never’), and thinking of 
oneself as European or national, 1992–2007 (percentage ‘only national’). 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1982–2007, weighted data. 
should decrease. This expectation is again not fully in accordance with empirical evidence. 
The general pattern is not one of linear trends. Rather, we observe fluctuations that affect the 
different publics in more or less the same way. Tentative explanations for these ups and 
downs refer to two factors: first, changes in basic economic conditions, social welfare 
cutbacks and security concerns (dissolution of the communist bloc and war in former 
Yugoslavia) and, secondly, the increasing importance of EU policy making for everyday life 
(Niedermayer 1997). In addition, in the early 1990s, the debate on European Monetary Union, 
in particular, may have depressed European identifications (Lilli 1998). 
Pride in being European 
Pride in being European is our second indicator of European identification.5 When we test the 
dimensionality of European pride and self-perceptions as a European citizen, we find that 
both attitudes are indeed originating in the same latent attitudinal construct (Table A1). This is 
so everywhere, though in some countries somewhat more pronounced (e.g. in the 
Netherlands) than in others (e.g. in Greece). This is not to say that the two indicators are 
equally distributed if it comes to country patterns (Table 1). Other things being equal, 
southerners seem to be prouder than citizens in the northern member countries. To be sure, 
geographical locations are poor explainers of political attitudes. Whether this ‘southern’ 
pattern has to do with economic factors (the South is a major receiver of transfers from the 
structural fund) or with 
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Table 1.  Pride to be a citizen of the EU, 1995–2004 
 EES 2004 Flash 1995 2004-1995 
Luxembourg 76 70 6 
Ireland 74 64 10 
Portugal 74 64 10 
Cyprus 74   
France 73 65 8 
Spain 67 66 1 
Italy 64 80 -16 
Greece 61 47 14 
Belgium 60 60 0 
Hungary 52   
Germany 49 42 7 
Poland 46   
Britain 43   
Denmark 43 49 -6 
Slovenia 42   
Austria 40 46 -6 
Slovakia 37   
Finland 37 41 -4 
Northern Ireland 31   
Czech Republic 29   
The Netherlands 26 45 -19 
Estonia 25   
Latvia 24   
Sweden 23 37 -14 
Percentage ‘very proud’ or ‘fairly proud’. 
Source: European Election Study (EES) 2004 and Eurobarometer Flash 47 (1995), weighted data. 
cultural factors (‘Latin Europeans’ are allegedly more expressive than others when it comes to 
emotions like pride) cannot be answered at this point, however. In addition to geography, 
duration of membership seems to matter somewhat more here, with citizens from younger 
non-southern member countries being less proud than others. 
Looking at the dynamics, we see signs of a growing gap between proud and non-proud 
national publics over the last decade. In 2004, we find everything between three quarters and 
one quarter of our respondents being proud of their European citizenship, both in old and new 
member countries. Significant decreases are notable in the Netherlands (−19), Italy (−16) and 
Sweden (−14); the steepest increases are diagnosed for Greece (+14), Portugal (+10) and 
Ireland (+10). The corresponding shifts in perceived citizenship are much smaller. Assuming 
that we can exclude methods effects, pride in being European seems to include a much 
stronger evaluative component that reacts to current and concrete political events 
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and decisions. The comparative stability of self-perception as European point to the fact that it 
can be considered an affective attitude (Scheuer 2005, 70f). 
We-feelings 
Our operational definition of ‘sense of community’ distinguishes two dimensions: 
identifications and we-feelings. We now turn to the second and investigate, first, whether EU 
citizens trust their fellow Europeans and, secondly, to what degree Europeans are ready to 
accept more member countries into the EU. 
Trust in European people 
Trust is a fundamental condition for the development of a sense of community. It is expected 
to increase with growing experiences of positive conduct of fellow citizens. So, here again, 
duration of membership should play an important role. Moreover, the existence of a common 
enemy is a potential factor contributing to the development of a sense of community. For 
most of the post-war period, the communist threat was an external reference point that might 
have fostered perceptions of a common bond amongst the people of the EU. Actually, since 
the collapse of the Soviet Empire, observers had been complaining about the return of 
nationalism, and fears had grown that the community may fall apart without the eastern threat. 
This did not happen, however, as we know by now. Rather, the EU was able to integrate a 
major part of the former communist bloc. How successful is this integration in terms of we-
feelings can be seen from the figures on trust in European people. 
Trust in people of various countries has been measured repeatedly in Eurobarometer 
surveys using a four-point scale between 1970 and 1994.6 As the list of member and candidate 
countries became longer, another instrument with a dichotomous answering scale proved to be 
more suitable.7 The European Election Study also used the dichotomous answer categories.8 
Earlier work has shown that trust between EU member countries is generally higher than 
between members and non-members, and that mutual trust between the EU member countries 
is growing over time (Niedermayer 1995). We use the data based on the dichotomous 
answering scale and analyse for every country how much its people are trusted by the peoples 
from the other member countries (Table 2). 
In 2004, the people from all but one ‘old’ EU-15 member countries are trusted by a two-
thirds majority of fellow Europeans. Only the British miss this threshold: they are down at 51 
per cent and have actually lost fifteen percentage points of trust over the past decade.9 
Considering the fact that levels of trust are even more stable than levels of perceived 
citizenship, this is a major drop indeed. What could have caused such a dramatic downfall? 
The only likely reason we can think of is the role that the UK played and continues to play in 
the Iraq war. It seems that the close alliance of the British with the Americans in this case has 
severely damaged the trust of their fellow Europeans. Interestingly, the loss in trust in the 
Brits is complemented by a 
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Table 2.  Trust in other European people, 1995–2004 
 2004 
EU-25 
2004 
EU-15 
1995 
EU-15 
Diff. EU-15 
2004-1995 
Swedes 83a 86 84 2 
Danish 79 82 81 1 
Finns 79 81 81 1 
Luxembourgers 78 82 84 -2 
Dutch 78 81 80 1 
Spaniards 77 80 71 9 
Belgians 75 78 82 -4 
Portuguese 73 76 68 9 
Germans 71 73 65 8 
Austrians 70 73 75 -1 
French 67 70 63 7 
Irish 66 73 71 1 
Italians 66 68 61 7 
Greeks 66 66 62 4 
Maltese 59 61   
Hungarians 59 59 56 3 
Czech 56 55 50 6 
Estonians 51 53   
British 51 50 66 -15 
Latvians 50 52   
Cypriots 50 48   
Lithuanians 49 50   
Poles 47 48 46 2 
Slovenes 47 46   
Slovaks 46 44   
Bulgarian 35 35   
Romanian 28 29   
Turks 26 26   
Percentage ‘tend to trust’. 
aRead: In 2004, 83 per cent of all non-Swedish EU-25 citizens considered the Swedes to be 
trustworthy. 
Source: Eurobarometer 45 (1995) and European Election Study (EES) 2004; weighted data. Note that 
this question was not asked in the Belgian, British, Lithuanian, Maltese and Swedish survey of the 
EES 2004. 
strong decrease of British pride in being European. The gap between British and Europeans 
was thus a case of mutual refusal. If this discord has been alleviated in the meantime cannot 
be answered, because unfortunately the trust question in the Eurobarometer surveys was 
discontinued in 1997. 
An additional major finding with regard to the levels of trust among EU citizens is that 
there are indeed three classes of countries: old members, new members, and (then and 
present) candidate countries, with old members enjoying highest trust, new members 
somewhat less trust, and candidate 
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countries only little trust. With the exception of the case of Britain, these three classes are 
accurately sorted one after the other. We also note that it does not make much of a difference 
for the levels of trust whether we analyse opinions of citizens in the old EU-15 or include the 
samples from the new member countries. 
Acceptance of new members 
There is no indication that the European Union after the last enlargements has found its final 
configuration yet. There is still a large number of would-be members beyond those who 
already take part. It is conceivable that some of them will join the EU in the future. Croatia 
and Turkey are official accession countries. The Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM) has also obtained the status of an accession country, but negotiations have not 
begun yet. All remaining Balkan countries are potential applicants: Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia as well as Kosovo (as defined by the UN resolution). The 
EU has repeatedly reaffirmed at the highest level its commitment for eventual EU 
membership of the western Balkan countries, provided they fulfil the accession criteria. While 
we-feelings are expressed toward actual members, the readiness to accept new member 
countries is indicative of a mental map in the minds of the citizens that may include some 
countries and reject others. Such a mental map does not have to be stable over time but may 
react to changes in the respective countries and the relationship to them. How welcome are 
additional member countries to the citizens of the EU, and did these attitudes change over 
time? Table 3 displays the development of approval to the accession of potential members for 
the last decade separately for old and new member states. 
The potential candidates presented to the respondents can be sorted in three groups.10 The 
first group contains Norway and Switzerland, both of which have declined membership on the 
bases of referenda, as well as Iceland, which has not signalled interest in joining the EU until 
now. The second group consists of a number of post-communist eastern and southeastern 
countries, such as the remaining parts of former Yugoslavia (Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and FYROM) as well as Ukraine and Albania. Turkey, 
finally, represents the third group and the bridge to the Islamic world. 
The accession of Switzerland, Norway and Iceland receives strongest support, although 
their accession is currently just a hypothetical case. Being rich Western countries, their entry 
would not imply new burdens to the union but enlarge the group of net-payer countries. Old 
and new members welcome them alike, with roughly four out of five respondents saying they 
would be in favour of these countries becoming part of the EU in the future. The accession of 
the western Balkan countries is approved by less than a majority of the EU citizens. Among 
them, Croatia performs best (even better than Bulgaria and Romania before their accession), 
and Albania receives the least approval. The support for Croatia has increased strongly from 
about 30 per cent in the year 2000 to about 50 per cent in 2008, while the entry of Bulgaria 
and Romania was approved by only about 40 per cent 
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Table 3.  Citizens’ views about accession of new member countries, 1997–2008 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2008 
EU-15          
Switzerland   70 70 75 75 76 77 77 
Norway   71 70 74 75 76 76 78 
Iceland     60 61 67 67 70 
Romania 33 37 34 33 36 35 41 38  
Bulgaria 36 39 36 35 38 39 45 42  
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
   27 30 31 39 36 39 
Croatia    31 33 35 47 46 51 
FYROM    27 29 30 39 37 39 
Yugoslaviaa    29 32  36   
Serbia        34 36 
Montenegro        37 39 
Kosovo         33 
Albania     27 27 32 30 33 
Ukraine       38 37 42 
Turkey   30 30 34 32 29 26 30 
NMS-10          
Switzerland       83 87 85 
Norway       82 86 84 
Iceland       72 78 77 
Romania       53 55  
Bulgaria       64 68  
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
      50 54 49 
Croatia       70 74 70 
FYROM       51 56 50 
Yugoslaviaa       50   
Serbia        52 46 
Montenegro        57 52 
Kosovo         40 
Albania       40 45 41 
Ukraine       57 62 62 
Turkey       38 37 40 
Percentage ‘in favour’. 
aIn the year 2005 named ‘Serbia and Montenegro’. NMS, new member states. 
Source: Eurobarometer autumn surveys, weighted data 
of Europeans in 2006. The readiness to accept new member countries from east and south-east 
Europe has generally increased in the course of the last five years. A very different situation is 
observed for Turkey. The approval for this country to join the EU remains around 30 per cent 
for the whole time period covered. Although the potential membership of Turkey has been an 
issue for many years already, it is less welcome than the other countries mentioned before. 
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Looking at the general picture, however, one can imagine a certain fatigue among the 
western EU members to extend their union each time to more and geographically distant 
countries. Although approval rates have increased slightly over time, only Croatia is approved 
by a majority of EU-15 citizens. The new member countries display by and large the same 
preference order of countries as the old member states, but show generally higher approval 
rates. Only a small number of potential member countries falls repeatedly below the majority 
threshold, namely Albania and Turkey as well as Kosovo (newly asked in 2008). The new 
members may take advantage from the smaller geographical distance and the broader 
experience with the relevant countries from Soviet times. It seems plausible that the new 
members need to play a bridging role when it comes to integrating more eastern members into 
the political community of the EU. 
Summary 
Over the past centuries, the common cultural and political roots of the people of Europe could 
seldom prevent long-standing hostilities from violent eruption. It was only after World War II 
that political elites started to initiate the process of European integration which deliberately 
aimed at creating a common framework of social and political identifications. The political 
institutional success of these efforts is obvious. But how about its social basis? Have the 
people of Europe grown together into a political community; is there a ‘sense of community’ 
among EU citizens? The general answer is yes. Over half a century after World War II, a 
majority of EU citizens identifies with the new political community in the European Union. 
Lacking pertinent and comparable survey information for most of this fifty-year period, we 
cannot determine when and how these identifications came into being. However, based on our 
findings from the analysis of available data, we must assume that they have been growing 
slowly. Over the last decade or so, there was not much of a secular change in European 
identifications; seasonal effects prevailed. If we drew a map of European Union 
identifications in the early 2000s, a centre–periphery picture would come to the fore. The 
highest level of identifications exists in the six original member countries, closely followed by 
European South; the further away one gets from this core of the Union in geographical and/or 
temporal terms, the weaker identifications become. 
Majorities of EU citizens trust the people of other member countries. The people of the new 
member countries in Central and Eastern Europe, however, are still less trusted, and Turks are 
trusted the least. Figures on trust as well as on readiness to accept new members show that 
European citizens have a rather clear-cut mental map of the Union, a shared understanding of 
who is alike and who is different. The new Eastern member countries are still considered 
different; the East–West continental divide remains detectable. It will take a while for them to 
be fully integrated and accepted in the European ingroup. An additional but somewhat minor 
difference is commonly seen between people from the North and the South of Europe. A 
common view of 
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all members is, however, that Turkey is clearly different from what is considered European. 
Notes 
1. This is an updated and revised version of a chapter that was originally published by the first author (Scheuer 
1999). 
2.  This is not to say that states must be linguistically homogeneous; Belgium and Switzerland are obvious 
examples of nation-states that are not. However, in order to meet democratic requirements, every citizen must 
be able to communicate with state authorities in his or her own language (Bundesverfassungsgericht 1993, 
438). This implies in places that there is more than one official language (such as three in Belgium and four 
in Switzerland). 
3  Question wording: ‘Do you ever think of yourself not only as a [nationality] citizen but also as a citizen of 
Europe? Often, sometimes, never’. 
4  Question wording: ‘In the near future do you see yourself as [nationality] only, [nationality] and European, 
European and [nationality], or European only?’. 
5  Question wording: ‘European Union Member States are “European citizens”. Are you personally proud or 
not to be a “European citizen”? Would you say that you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, or not at 
all proud?’. 
6  Question wording: ‘I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various 
countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust, or no trust 
at all’. 
7. Modified question wording: ‘For each, please tell me whether you tend to trust them or tend not to trust 
them’. 
8. Question wording: ‘Now I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from 
various countries. Can you please tell me for each, whether you have a lot of trust of them or not very much 
trust. If you do not know a country well enough, just say so and I will go on to the next. How about the 
Austrians: do have a lot of trust of them or not very much trust?’. 
9. In order to avoid distortion through composition effects, over-time changes are calculated on the basis of EU-
15 countries only. 
10. Question wording: ‘For each of the following countries, would you be in favour or against it becoming part 
of the European Union in the future?’. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1.   Those who consider themselves as European citizens, 1992–2007 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 
Belgium 58 65 66 61 50 47 53 56 56 52 62 54 62 64 69 
France 67 65 75 68 63 64 64 59 62 63 65 63 68 66 67 
Germany 55 54 66 60 47 48 49 49 54 57 60 61 61 63 69 
Italy 69 70 71 73 62 63 68 71 73 66 77 72 65 61 44 
Luxembourg 69 63 76 75 71 73 67 72 73 75 74 74 66 74 76 
The 
Netherlands 
56 59 65 60 57 57 57 56 57 54 58 54 59 65 70 
Denmark 51 50 51 46 42 44 49 44 47 59 62 62 58 60 62 
UK 43 37 48 42 37 38 35 30 31 28 34 33 38 34 38 
Ireland 46 49 58 53 47 47 45 44 47 43 53 47 53 47 40 
Greece 60 56 54 47 38 46 46 40 44 41 49 48 43 53 51 
Spain 60 55 61 55 54 52 60 63 70 59 67 65 61 58 62 
Portugal 58 52 55 53 46 39 37 47 48 47 53 49 51 55 48 
Austria    46 44  47 51 48 52 55 48 51 52 54 
Finland   59 47 40  45 38 41 40 44 42 42 51 51 
Sweden    38 34  39 37 40 48 47 47 46 56 54 
Cyprus 
(south) 
            69 69 61 
Malta             66 71 66 
Poland             54 59 54 
Czech 
Republic 
            42 61 50 
Slovakia             61 60 55 
Hungary             35 49 54 
Slovenia             55 64 63 
Estonia             54 48 51 
Latvia             51 54 43 
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Table A1.  (Continued) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 
Lithuania             43 44 42 
Bulgaria             54 42 50 
Romania             53 56 42 
Turkey             28 22  
Cyprus 
(north) 
            48   
Croatia             63 66  
Original 6a 62 62 69 65 56 57 59 58 62 61 66 64 64 63 62 
1st 
extensionb 
44 39 49 43 38 39 37 32 33 31 37 36 41 37 40 
2nd 
extensionc 
60 55 59 53 50 49 53 56 61 54 62 59 56 57 58 
3rd 
extensiond 
   43 39  43 42 44 47 49 47 47 54 53 
4th 
extensione 
            50 57 53 
5th 
extensionf 
             55 44 
‘Only European’, ‘European and national’ and ‘national and European’. 
aBelgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Germany, Italy. 
bUK, Ireland, Denmark. 
cGreece, Spain, Portugal. 
dAustria, Finland, Sweden. 
eCyprus, Malta, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. 
fBulgaria, Romania. 
Source: Eurobarometer, weighted data (national weight for country figures, EU-weight for country groups). 
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Table A2. Mokken scaling of European pride and identifications as a European citizen 
 H-value 
The Netherlands 0.77 
Finland 0.76 
Northern Ireland 0.74 
Cyprus 0.69 
Estonia 0.69 
Italy 0.66 
Latvia 0.66 
Czech Republic 0.65 
Austria 0.64 
Slovakia 0.64 
Ireland 0.60 
Belgium 0.58 
Britain 0.53 
Denmark 0.53 
Hungary 0.52 
Slovenia 0.52 
Poland 0.49 
France 0.46 
Luxembourg 0.46 
Portugal 0.46 
Germany 0.43 
Spain 0.42 
Greece 0.41 
Source: European Election Study (EES) 2004. Mokken scaling tests for the unidimensionality of a set 
of items. Meaning of H-values: below 0.30 = no scale, above 0.30 = a weak scale, above 0.40 = a 
medium scale, and above 0.50 = a strong scale. 
